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Abstract. Management and use of robots, and Artificial Moral Agents (AMAs)
more broadly, may involve contexts where the machines are expected to make
moral decisions. The design of an AMA is typically compartmentalised among AI
researchers and engineers on the one hand and philosophers on the other. This has
had the effect that of the current AMAs, either none or at most one specified nor-
mative ethical theory is incorporated as basis. This is problematic because it nar-
rows down the AMA’s functional ability and versatility since it results in moral
outcomes that only some people agree with, and possibly going counter to cultural
norms, thereby undermining an AMA’s ability to be moral in a human sense. We
aim to address this by taking a first step toward normed behaviour. We propose a
three-layered model for general normative ethical theories, therewith enabling the
representation of multiple normative theories, and users’ specific instances thereof.
The main model, called Genet, can be used to serialise in XML the ethical views
of people and businesses for an AMA and it is also available in OWL format for
use in automated reasoning. This short paper illustrates Genet with Kantianism and
utilitarianism, and the ‘Mia the alcoholic’ use case.
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1. Introduction
While robots were originally only ‘dumb’, and some are intentionally designed in this
way, such as in factory automation, recent years has seen an increase in humanoid robots
and digital assistants with one or more autonomous capacities purported to be useful
to humans. This brings the artefact into the realm of being an Artificial Moral Agent
(AMA), i.e., a computerised entity that can act as an agent and make moral decisions
[1]. Moral agency, to be precise, is the philosophical notion of an entity that both has
the ability to make a moral decision freely and has a kind of understanding of what each
available action means in its context. There are multiple different ways of creating this
artificial agency; e.g., [2,3,4,5]. What they have in common is that they all take a single-
theory approach as basis for the AMA’s reasoning, using either one ethical theory from
moral philosophy or choosing some other goal that is morality-adjacent, but not nec-
essarily morally justified (e.g., maximising agreement of stakeholders). Moral philoso-
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phers discuss ethical theories, but then assess which one best to use for AMAs, rather
than considering a plurality of norms; e.g., [1,6,7].
AMAs designed with one ethical theory only have the advantage of deterministic
behaviour, but come with two major problems. The first is their rigidity: by reasoning in
only one specific way for every situation, such an AMA is inadvertently opposing people
who hold different views, and therewith is bound to cause controversy and divide across
people [8]. For instance, take the popular moral dilemma in computer ethics related to
robots, called “Mia the Alcoholic” [9]. Mia is an alcoholic who, due to an injury, is
unable to care for herself and is assigned a smart caregiver robot. One day Mia gets
drunk and requests that the robot bring her more alcohol. The dilemma is whether the
robot should comply or not, where the robot’s configured normative theory may lead to
different actions: doing so will result in harm to Mia’s health, but also result in drunken
bliss that may be more important to Mia. The second common problem is the infeasibility
of storing sufficient information about relevant people and entities. That is, if an AMA
has to take into consideration the effects its actions will have on people, including how
its actions will violate or concur with people’s beliefs, it would need to store gigabytes
of moral data per stakeholder to calculate the outcome, which is computationally and
economically very expensive.
We aim to address these problems by creating a general multi-layered model for eth-
ical theories. The top layer seeks to provide a standardised way to define any ethical the-
ory in a manner that an AMA can process and use in reasoning. The middle layer consists
of theories such as Kantianism, Egoism, and Divine Command Theory. The bottom layer
consists of instantiations of such theories for individuals, which can ultimately be used
in the reasoning. This approach solves the rigidity problem by providing easy switching
between alternative ethical theories, as well as the computational expense problem by
succinctly modelling general theories that take up only a few kilobytes of space, yet are
specific enough to represent a user’s true ethical theory they ascribe to.
In the rest of this short paper, we introduce the three-layered approach and two of the
modelled theories in Sections 2 and 3, evaluate it in Section 4, and conclude in Section 5.
Please refer to our extended technical report for further details [10].
2. Modelling ethical theories
To model ethical theories in the context of AMA’s, we opted for a primarily rule-based
approach. This was to model the theories as close as possible to the original ideas of
the moral philosophers that champion the respective theories. Our approach stands in
contrast to contrary-to-duty structures, such as [11], which formally allow for situations
where a primary obligation may be overridden given a special set of circumstances. In
normative ethics, this is usually avoided because ethical theories that allow for exceptions
are prone to fall prey to consequentialist regression (where actions are decided purely on
circumstances, not on principles); see [12] for details. Note that our approach caters for
rule-based theories as well as consequence-based theories, as discussed below.
We have identified three layers of genericity for normative ethical theories that need
to be represented (see Fig. 1): the notion of an ethical theory in general, a base theory
(e.g., deontology) that adheres to that general model, and a theory instance recording
a real entity’s theory that adheres to a chosen base theory (e.g., Mia’s utilitarianism).
Figure 1. A three-layer design with example ethical norms and instances.
Figure 2. Informal compact visualisation of Genet.
The General Ethical Theory model, Genet (see Fig. 2), aims to represent typical fea-
tures across ethical theories, and therewith also constrain any base ethical theory. From
base theory definitions, personal instances can then be instantiated to be used in AMA
reasoning. Genet includes amoral properties for computational logistics, like its base
theory and instance name, metaethical properties that define moral aspects not core to
the theory, like what kinds of moral patients are included and excluded, and normative
components that specify the core of how a theory judges right from wrong.
Metaethical components: they consist of (i) the agent, being the person or organi-
sation Genet is reasoning on behalf of, (ii) an influence threshold for how much moral
weight to assign the commands of a person under an influence, like alcohol, and (iii)
moral patient kinds for what and who deserves moral consideration (e.g., animals, nature,
art, people).
Normative components: this is the core part, which defines how a theory assigns
morality to actions. It consists of consequentiality and moral principles. Regarding con-
sequentiality, the theories we include in this paper are all either consequential or non-
consequential, i.e. either the consequences of an action take moral precedence (utilitari-
anism) or the actions themselves do (Kantianism). Since a theory’s consequentiality fun-
damentally affects how the entire theory works, the consequentiality property is a
direct attribute of the theory.
Principles: The core of an ethical theory is the collection of principles which drives
it. Each principle is defined by (i) whether it represents a kind of moral good or bad, (ii)
the moral occurrence it represents, and (iii) to which subjects it applies.
Genet has been serialised in XML for easy incorporation into applications and has
been transferred into an OWL version to provide a formalisation of it and possible inte-
gration with extant reasoners and ontologies3. The OWL version has a few generalisation
to lift up the XML model into a so-called ‘application ontology’. This involved, among
others, reification of Genet’s attributes, in line with general ontology design principles.
For instance, Genet attributes such as morality and influenceThreshold were made
OWL classes that have a data property genet:hasValue to permit associating values to
them (like Boolean) and where advantageous, Genet’s attribute’s ‘values’ were made
OWL classes as well, such as for patientKind and subject, since then it facilitates
alignment to ontologies about agents or sentient beings.
3. Base theory models
Genet’s base theory modelling ability is realised by imposing model constraints. When
representing a base theory, one must assign values to some Genet components and leave
others unassigned, as applicable. Upon instantiation, all unassigned attributes and ele-
ments must be set by the instantiator (i.e., the person or business whose theory is being
represented). After instantiation, no properties may be altered during runtime, because
any alteration would mean a change in theory and so would require a theory reload.
Updating Genet properties during runtime can lead to grave inconsistencies and un-
favourable reasoning outcomes, which is exactly what we strive to avoid. Ontologically,
this also makes sense: a ‘change’ in a theory amounts to a different theory, hence requires
a new theory instance.
The base theory for utilitarianism The purpose of utilitarianism is to maximise pref-
erence satisfaction of all people by evaluating the consequences of actions. We can model
this as a set of five principles, each assigning moral goodness to one of Maslow’s human
needs [13]. Fig. 3 visualises this base model.
The base theory for Kantianism Kantianism advocates deducing moral duties by
pure reason. Kant believed that it is not possible to produce an exhaustive list of duties,
but rather that an agent should practise her moral deduction method every time she has a
moral decision to make [14]. So, it is not possible to make an exhaustive list of principles,
but we can specify Kant’s two best-known formulations of the core of his ethics: the
categorical imperatives, being the formulation of universalisability and of humanity.
Adding more base theories We have here summarised how the ethical norms of utili-
tarianism and Kantianism can be modelled using Genet. In our extended technical report
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Figure 3. Visualisation of the utilitarianism base model. For space concerns, all unset values are omitted in
this diagram. They are exactly as defined in Genet and must be set upon instantiation.
we developed models and evaluated two more theories, namely egoism and divine com-
mand theory [10]. Thanks to Genet’s generality of design, many more normative theo-
ries can be modelled, and furthermore within each theory, alterations (such as removing
principles) can be made to have it better suit its representing entity’s true beliefs.
The procedure of instantiating a theory consists in (i) selecting or creating a base
theory model, (ii) optionally altering the set of principles as allowed by a base theory
principle’s mutability attribute, and (iii) instantiating said base model by assigning
values to the remaining undefined properties (like the instance name and agent’s details).
4. Evaluation
Genet was designed specifically so that a manufacturer can configure their AMAs with
any of the multiple ethical theories. To demonstrate the value hereof, let us consider
Genet in action in Mia’s caregiver robot use case. We label carrying out Mia’s request as
A1 and denying it as A2.
If the carebot has utilitarianism loaded, the AMA must start by extrapolating some
consequences from the situation. Complying with Mia’s request promotes her esteem be-
cause her commands are adhered to. From searching for relevant principles in the ethical
theory, the AMA finds that esteemSatisfaction is a morally good principle and loads
it as a premise. These two premises can be used to infer that A1 increases happiness
(and thus has some moral good). However, A1 will also harm Mia physiologically (by
damaging her liver, giving her a hangover, etc.). From the Genet instance the AMA loads
that physiologicalSatisfaction is morally good. These premises imply that A1 de-
creases happiness (and thus has some moral wrong). At the final inference the AMA must
consolidate the conflicting moral categorisations of A1 by weighing the two subconclu-
sions in the standard utilitarian fashion. The harm of A1 (physiologically) outweighs the
good thereof (esteem satisfaction) and therefore A1 is concluded as wrong.
On the other hand, if the carebot has Kantianism loaded, it will start by loading
in Kantian principles and then check to see whether that action is permissible by their
standards. An outline of how Genet may be used in argumentation can be seen in Fig.
4. The first principle is universalWillability. A universe in which robots always
obey their masters’ commands certainly is morally coherent and thus the first Kantian
requirement is met. The second principle holds that treating a person as a mere means to
one’s own end is wrong. By declining to fix Mia a drink, the bot is treating her as a means
to its own end of healing her. Since the carebot has autonomy in the situation and since
its goal misaligns with Mia’s, by declining her request it is considering its own ends as
of greater value than hers (denying her rational autonomy). This is unequivocally wrong
by Kant’s standards, and thus A2 fails the second Kantian requirement. Even though A2
passes one of the two requirements, both need to pass in order for an action to be right
by Kantianism. Thus, the AMA concludes that A2 is wrong.
Figure 4. Visualisation of the Kantian argument for the morality of action A2 (denying the request) in the Mia
use case. The black arrows represent inferences.
5. Conclusion
A three-layered approach was proposed to enable storing multiple ethical theories. These
base theories are governed by Genet, a model in XML and formalised in OWL as a first
step toward an application ontology. Genet constrains the possible properties and values
of the base theories, which then can be instantiated for each user and incorporated in the
artificial moral agent. Benefits of equipping a robot with configurability of the normed
behaviour was briefly illustrated with ‘Mia the alcoholic’ use case.
Future work will consider capabilities for choosing between different ethical theo-
ries. An implementation of our design has the advantage of reusability thanks to easily
swappable model configurations and standardisation cf. managing multiple single-theory
AMAs. We also plan to add more ethical theories, possibly adding an agent module to
the ontology, robust use case evaluations, and theory extraction from the AMA’s user.
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